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Abstract—This paper studies the problem of procuring diverse
resources in a forward market to cover a set E of uncertain
demand signals e. We consider two scenarios: (a) e is revealed
all at once by an oracle (b) e reveals itself causally. Each sce-
nario induces an optimal procurement cost. The ratio between
these two costs is defined as the price of causality. It captures
the additional cost of not knowing the future values of the
uncertain demand signal. We consider two application contexts:
procuring energy reserves from a forward capacity market, and
purchasing virtual machine instances from a cloud service. An
upper bound on the price of causality is obtained, and the
exact price of causality is computed for some special cases. The
algorithmic basis for all these computations is set containment
linear programming. A mechanism is proposed to allocate the
procurement cost to consumers who in aggregate produce the
demand signal. We show that the proposed cost allocation is
fair, budget-balanced, and respects the cost-causation principle.
The results are validated through numerical simulations.
I. INTRODUCTION
Many complex systems consist of both controllable and un-
controllable resources. Examples range from power systems,
computing systems, transportation systems, among others.
Uncontrollable resources inject uncertainties in the system,
which collectively generate an uncertain demand signal that
needs to be balanced by the controllable resources. We in-
vestigate optimal resource procurement necessary to balance
the uncertain aggregate demand signal. One example is that
of a grid operator that needs to procure energy reserves from
the forward capacity market. He can choose from diverse
resources, such as batteries, generators, aggregation of loads,
etc. These resources are used to cover imbalances between
electricity supply and demand for the grid. Another example
is that of a company buying virtual machines from a cloud
provider to serve computational demands, which are typically
heterogeneous. The common thread that binds these examples
is the ex-ante procurement of diverse resources to cover an
uncertain signal revealed in real-time.
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What is the optimal resource asset mix that covers all uncer-
tain demand signals e ∈ E? The purchase decision depends
on the unit prices of the resources, their dynamic constraints,
and critically on the control strategy that allocates the signal
to the procured resources. The resource procurement decision
is therefore intimately coupled with the real-time control
strategy associated with allocation. Since the signal reveals
itself in real-time, the allocation policy needs to be causal.
The operator needs to irrevocably commit procured resources
to match the uncertain demand e without the luxury of
knowing its future values. Clearly, the resource procurement
cost under causal policies will be higher than that under
arbitrary(possibly non-causal) policies. This inspires us to
quantify the effect of causality on optimal resource procure-
ment cost.
A second issue is that of paying for the procurement cost. Ide-
ally, the cost allocation should be fair, budget-balanced, and
follow the cost causation principle. This principle enunciates
that agents are penalized (rewarded) in proportion to their
contribution (mitigation) of the need to procure balancing
resources. We explore cost allocation mechanisms that satisfy
these requirements.
A. Our Contribution
We formulate optimal resource procurement as a set con-
tainment problem. In particular, consider an operator that
procures diverse resources to cover a sequence of uncertain
signals revealed over a delivery window of length T . Each
resource has linear dynamic constraints, which can be mod-
eled as a convex set in RT . Uncertain signals are modeled as
belonging to a specified convex set E. The operator needs to
determine the optimal resource mix to collectively cover all
signals in E. The principle contributions of the paper are:
• We define the price of causality (PoC). It is the ratio
of the optimal procurement cost under causal policies
to that under arbitrary (possibly non-causal) policies.
It quantifies the additional cost for not knowing the
information in the future.
• We derive an upper bound on the price of causality. The
algorithmic basis of this computation is set containment
linear programming.
• We obtain the exact price of causality for some special
cases. Through these cases, we show that dynamics and
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2diversity are the main factors that drive the price of
causality to be greater than 1.
• A cost allocation mechanism is proposed. It is fair, bud-
get balanced, and respects the cost causation principle.
• We illustrate our framework in two application contexts:
procuring energy reserves from forward capacity mar-
kets, and buying virtual machines from cloud providers.
B. Related Work
A closely related problem is online optimization [2], [3]. It
studies sequential decisions made irrevocably at each time
step without access to future information. This problem is
widely studied in many areas, such as stochastic dynamic
programs [4], communication networks [5], online allocation
[6], [7], load balancing [8], among others. A standard mea-
sure to evaluate the performance of an online solution is the
competitive ratio [2]. This compares the performance of the
optimal online algorithm, where all information is revealed
causally, to the performance of the optimal offline algorithm,
which is an unrealizable algorithm with complete information
about the future. Online optimization problems consider the
available resources to be fixed and aim to find the optimal
causal decisions that minimize real-time costs. Our problem
is distinct. We consider resource procurement problems that
minimize ex-ante capacity cost. This distinction differentiates
the price of causality from the competitive ratio.
Aside from online optimization, another strand of related
work studies the adequacy of resources in real-time decision
making. For instance, Dertouzos et al. studies the online
processor time allocation problem in [9], and shows that
optimal scheduling is impossible without a priori knowledge
on the start times of tasks. Subramanian et al. considers a
real-time scheduling problem for distributed energy resources
to reduce the grid energy cost [10]. Wenzel et al. studies real-
time charging strategies for electric vehicles to provide ancil-
lary services with minimum tracking error [11]. Madjidian et
al. discovers the trade-off between absorbing and releasing
energy for collective loads under causal allocation policies
[12]. In all of these works, the quantity of available resources
is fixed. Their focus is on analysis of causal policies. In
contrast, we investigate optimal resource procurement to
meet worst case adequacy.
The closest related works are [13] and [14]. Negrete-Pincetic
et al. considers a supplier who owns uncertain renewable
generations and also purchases energy in day-ahead and real-
time markets to serve the deferrable loads [14]. They show
that the optimal procurement costs under causal allocation
policy and offline allocation policy are the same, i.e., the
price of causality is 1. In [13] and [14], the supplier can
purchase additional energy from the real-time markets when
the day-ahead procurement is not enough. This is distinct
from our problem, where all procurement decisions are made
in advance, and no recourse is available in real time.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The
resource procurement problem is formulated in Section II,
followed by some examples in Section III. Section IV and
Section V present an upper bound for the price of causality
and study some special cases. Section VI discusses the
cost allocation mechanism, followed by numerical studies in
Section VII. Concluding remarks and future directions are
offered in Section VIII.
C. Notation
Throughout the paper, R denotes the set of real numbers.
N denotes the total number of resources. T denotes the
time horizon. For any positive integer Z, [Z] denotes the set
{1, . . . , Z}. If δ ∈ R and A is a set, then ηA = {ηa|a ∈ A}.
For two sets A and B, A = B means A ⊆ B and A ⊇ B.
A⊕B denotes their Minkowski sum, i.e., A⊕B = {a+b|a ∈
A, b ∈ B}.
II. OPTIMAL RESOURCE PROCUREMENT
A. Problem Setup
Consider two types of resources: controllable resources, and
uncontrollable resources. Uncontrollable resources generate
an uncertain demand signal, which must be balanced by
controllable resources over a delivery window. We segment
this delivery window into T contiguous periods, and denote
e = (e1, . . . , eT ) as the demand signal over these periods.
We model the uncertain demand signal e as being contained
in the set E ⊂ RT , and make the following assumption:
Assumption 1. E is a bounded convex polytope in RT .
In many applications, the demand signal e is modeled
stochastically. In our case, the polytope E can be interpreted
as the support of the distribution of e, or as the confidence
interval such that e ∈ E with probability 1 − . In the case
study section, we will give an example of how to derive E
based on real data.
To balance the uncertain demand signal, an operator chooses
from a group of N controllable resources. These resources
have diverse prices and dynamic constraints. Resource i can
generate a sequence of outputs over the horizon [1, . . . , T ],
denoted as si = (s1i , . . . , s
T
i ). Let si ∈ Si, where Si is the set
of all possible output sequences constrained by the resource
dynamics. We make the following assumption:
Assumption 2. Si is a bounded and convex polytope in RT ,
and 0 is in the interior of Si for all i ∈ [N ].
Assumption 2 holds if the dynamic constraints of the re-
sources are linear. Note that 0 ∈ int (Si) trivially holds as
the resource can be idle over the delivery window.
3Time t
Procure Resources
t = 0
Dispatch Resources
delirvery window
t ∈ [1, T ]
• • •
Figure 1. Time line of the resource procurement problem.
We refer to Si as a unit resource. Unit resource Si is offered
at price pii. If the operator purchases αi units of resource
i, he pays αipii, and has the right to command any signal
si ∈ αiSi in the delivery window.
The time-line of the problem is shown in Figure 1. At time
t = 0, the operator purchases the minimum-cost asset mix
of controllable resources in a forward market. During the
delivery window [1, . . . , T ], the time sequence of the demand
signal e is revealed causally (one sample at a time), and the
operator dispatches procured resources to match the demand
signal. The operator pays a capital cost for the procured
resources, but does not pay for subsequent use of these
resources during dispatch.
The optimal resource procurement problem is:
J∗ = min
α1,...,αN
N∑
i=1
αipii (1)
{
E ⊆ α1S1 ⊕ α2S2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ αNSN , (2a)
αi ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ [N ]. (2b)
The polytope containment constraint (2a) requires all demand
signals e ∈ E be covered by the procured resource mix. Note
that (1) always has a solution as 0 is an interior point of Si
(see Assumption 2).
B. Energy Reserve Procurement
Consider a forward reserve market, where a system operator
procures energy reserves to balance the supply and demand
in electricity. We categorize the assets in power systems as
controllable resources and uncontrollable resources. These
resources are modeled as follows:
1) Controllable Resources: Controllable resources include
generators, batteries, aggregation of thermostatically con-
trolled loads [15], [16], among others. They can provide
electricity on demand to balance supply and demand. Con-
sider N types of controllable resources in a forward reserve
market. Resource i can produce a power sequence si during
the delivery window [1, . . . , T ]. The sequence ei is confined
by the dynamics. Assume the dynamic constraints of each
resource are linear, then Si is a polytope. As an example,
consider a battery with capacity constraint Ci, charge rate
constraint r¯i and discharge rate constraint ri. The power
sequence si is constrained by:{
ri ≤ sti ≤ r¯i, ∀t ∈ [T ],
0 ≤ θiCi +
∑t
k=1 s
k
i ≤ Ci, ∀t ∈ [T ], i ∈ [N ],
where θi is the initial state of charge. It can be easily verified
that Si is a polytope. It satisfies Assumption 2.
2) Uncontrollable Resources: Examples of uncontrollable
resources include wind farms, solar panels, and random
loads. These resources cannot be dispatched by the system
operator. They inject uncertainty to the system, and create
imbalances between the supply and demand.
Consider a two-settlement electricity market that consists of
a day-ahead market and a real-time market. Each uncontrol-
lable resource trades in the day-ahead market based on the
forecast of electricity consumption (production). The forecast
error creates an imbalance between supply and demand in the
real-time market. We model the imbalance signal as a vector
e ∈ RT , and assume it takes values in a polytope E ⊂ RT .
It can be viewed as support of the distribution of e, or a
confident interval so that e ∈ E with high probability.
3) Balancing: The reserve procurement problem is to deter-
mine the asset mix of controllable resources so that all e ∈ E
are covered. This reduces to an instance of (1).
C. Cloud Computing
Consider a company that procures virtual machine instances
from a cloud provider (such as Amazon EC2) to serve
workloads from users. Two types of workloads are consid-
ered: (a) transactional workloads, (b) non-interactive batch
workloads. Transactional workloads such as web applications
are highly unpredictable and require immediate response.
On the other hand, non-interactive batch workloads can be
predicted and only require completion within a specified
time frame [17]. For example, a financial institution uses
transactional workloads to trade stocks and query indices,
and uses non-interactive workloads to analyze investment
portfolio and model stock performance [18].
The company purchases on-demand instances from cloud
providers to serve these workloads. On-demand instances can
be requested at any time. It is charged in a pay-as-you-go
manner with a specified price per unit time. For instance,
Amazon ECS adopts a price-per-hour policy that rounds up
partial hours of usage [19]. Note that new instances cannot
be initialized instantaneously. Typically, there is a delay of
several minutes [20] due to hardware resource allocation and
the boot of new systems. Therefore, the company should
procure enough instances in advance, instead of reactively
purchasing instances after the workload arrives. This moti-
vates the following problem: how many instances are enough
to serve all workloads over a horizon (e.g., 20 minutes)?
4To tackle this problem, we model the instances, non-
interactive workloads and transactional workloads as follows:
Instances: without loss of generality, we assume all instances
are homogeneous, and the length of each period is 1. We
model an instance as a unit resource. The output of the
resource is st1, which represents the fraction of time the
instance works during the period t. Accordingly, st1 satisfies
the following constraint:
0 ≤ st1 ≤ 1, ∀t ∈ [T ], (3)
Let s1 = (s11, . . . , s
T
1 ), and define S1 = {s1|0 ≤ st1 ≤ 1,∀t ∈
[T ]}. Clearly, S1 is a hyper-box.
Non-Interactive Batch Workloads: we model the collection of
non-interactive workloads as a non-scalable resource. In par-
ticular, consider M non-interactive workloads. Each of them
has an arrival time am, a deadline dm and a computation time
cm, such that cm ≤ dm− am. Assume the workloads can be
interrupted, and each workload can be assigned to at most
one instance at a time. Let rtm denote the fraction of instance
computation time allocated to workload m over the period t,
then we have 0 ≤ rtm ≤ 1. Denote st2 as the total fraction of
instance computing time provided by all batch workloads.
Since the workloads demand computing resources, st2 is
negative, and satisfies the following constraints:
st2 = −
M∑
m=1
rtm, ∀t ∈ [T ] (4a)
T∑
t=1
rtm = cm, ∀m ∈ [M ], (4b)
0 ≤ rtm ≤ 1, ∀am ≤ t ≤ dm, (4c)
rtm = 0, ∀t < am, ∀t > dm. (4d)
where [M ] = {1, . . . ,M}, and (4b)-(4d) ensures all work-
loads to be completed by the deadline. Let s2 = (s12, . . . , s
T
2 ),
and define S2 as the set of s2 that satisfies (4). It can be
verified that S2 is a bounded and convex polytope.
Transactional Workloads: we model transactional workloads
as a sequence of uncertain signals. At time t, all transactional
workloads together require et amount of instance computa-
tion time. Let e = (e1, . . . , eT ). Assume that e only takes
value in a polytope E ⊂ RT . In this case, both S1, S2 and E
are polytopes. Assumption 1 and Assumption 2 are satisfied.
The resource procurement problem is as follows:
min
α1
α1 (5){
E ⊆ α1S1 ⊕ S2 (6a)
α1 ≥ 0. (6b)
where S1 and S2 are defined as (3) and (4), respectively.
III. THE ORACLE CASE
This section studies the optimal resource procurement prob-
lem (1) under oracle information. We characterize the exact
solution to (1) as a linear program. We also pinpoint the
difficulty of implementing this solution due to the causal
revelation of the uncertain demand e.
We first note that since Si is convex, the controllable re-
sources cover all uncertain signals in E if and only they
cover all extreme cases of E. As E is a polytope, these
extreme cases correspond to its vertices. Therefore, the
set containment constraint (2a) is equivalent to requiring
that all vertices of E be contained in the Minkowski sum
α1S1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ αNSN . If we represent E as the convex hull
of its vertices, i.e., E = conv (v1, . . . , vK), then (2a) is
equivalent to:
vk ∈ α1S1 ⊕ α2S2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ αNSN , ∀k ∈ [K]. (7)
If we represent each resource Si as the intersection of half-
spaces Si = {si ∈ RT |Aisi ≤ Bi}, the optimal resource
procurement problem becomes:
Theorem 1. The resource procurement problem (1) is equiv-
alent to:
min
N∑
i=1
αipii (8)
vk =
N∑
i=1
qi,k, ∀k ∈ [K], (9a)
Aiqi,k ≤ αiBi, ∀k ∈ [K], i ∈ [N ], (9b)
αi ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ [N ]. (9c)
The decision variables are α1, . . . , αN and qi,k ∈ RT , ∀i, k.
The proof is deferred to the Appendix. Theorem 1 asserts
that J∗ can be determined by solving the linear program (8).
This is a joint optimization over the resource asset mix α
and vertex factorizations qi,k.
Remark 1. Polytopes can be characterized in two ways:
intersection of half-spaces (H-representation) or convex hull
of vertices (V-representation). These representations are
equivalent. We have chosen a V-representation for the set
E and H-representation for sets Si. We comment that the
computational complexity of (1) crucially depends on these
choices [21].
IV. THE PRICE OF CAUSALITY
A. Causality Matters
The resource procurement problem (1) embeds an underlying
resource allocation problem. To realize the solution to (1),
each uncertain signal e ∈ E must be feasibly allocated to
the procured resources during the delivery window, i.e.,
e =
N∑
i=1
si, si ∈ αiSi. (10)
This is a factorization of e. It can be done if each element of
the vector e is known apriori at the beginning of the delivery
5window. However, the uncertain signal e is revealed causally.
At each time t, the operator must irreversibly commit to a
resource allocation of the sample et without knowing future
values. We now argue that this is not always possible under
the solution to (1) prescribed in Theorem 1.
Consider two resources over three time periods, i.e.,
N = 2 and T = 3. Let the demand signal set E =
conv{(0, 0, 0), (1, 1,−2), (1, 1, 4)}. The resources are batter-
ies. Battery i has a capacity constraint Ci and a maximum
charge/discharge rate ri. Unit battery i has a price pii. Let
C1 = C2 = 3
r1 = 3, r2 = 1
pi1 = 3, pi2 = 1.
Assume all batteries are fully discharged at time 0. Rhen, the
feasible energy output s1 ∈ S1 of the first battery satisfies
the linear constraints:
0 ≤ s11 ≤ 3;
0 ≤ s11 + s21 ≤ 3;
0 ≤ s11 + s21 + s31 ≤ 3,
−3 ≤ st1 ≤ 3, ∀t = 1, 2, 3.
(11)
The feasible energy output s2 ∈ S2 of the second battery
satisfies the linear constraints:
0 ≤ s12 ≤ 3;
0 ≤ s12 + s22 ≤ 3;
0 ≤ s12 + s22 + s32 ≤ 3,
−1 ≤ st2 ≤ 1, ∀t = 1, 2, 3.
(12)
From (11) and (12), the controllable resource sets Si are
bounded polytopes, and clearly, 0 ∈ int (Si). The resource
procurement problem without causality constraint is:
min
α1,α2
3α1 + α2 (13)
{
E ⊆ α1S1 ⊕ α2S2 (14a)
α1 ≥ 0, α2 ≥ 0, (14b)
We show in the Appendix that:
Proposition 1. The optimal resource procurement problem
without causality constraint (13) has a unique solution α∗1 =
α∗2 = 1. This optimal asset mix is insufficient to causally
cover the demand set E.
This motivates us to incorporate causality constraints explic-
itly in the resource procurement problem.
B. Optimal Resource Procurement under Causality
We require the following definitions:
Definition 1. A map φ : RT → RT : (u1, u2, . . . , uT ) →
(y1, y2, . . . , yT ) is called causal if and only if:
y1 = function of u1,
y2 = function of (u1, u2),
...
yT = function of (u1, . . . , uT ).
Definition 2. An allocation policy γ = (φ1, . . . , φN ) is a
collection of maps φi : E → αiSi such that∑
i
φi(e) = e.
In other words, γ allocates the uncertain demand signal e
to each of the procured resources αiSi. The sum of these
allocations covers e. The policy γ can be regarded as a
factorization of the identify map I as
∑
i∈[N ] φi = I .
Definition 3. The allocation policy γ is said to be causal if
and only if its component maps φi are causal.
Let Γ denote the set of all causal allocation policies. The op-
timal resource procurement problem under causal allocation
can be cast as:
J∗∗ = min
α1,...,αN ,γ(·)
N∑
i=1
αipi (15)

φi(e) ∈ αiSi (16a)∑
i∈[N ]
φi(e) = e (16b)
γ = (φ1, . . . , φN ) ∈ Γ, αi ≥ 0, (16c)
∀e ∈ E, (16d)
where (16b) dictates that γ is a factorization of demand signal
e, (16c) restricts the allocation policy to be causal, and (16d)
requires that all signals in E are covered. This is a joint
optimization over the asset mix α and the causal allocation
policy γ.
C. Price of Causality
The resource procurement problem (15) reduces to (1) if γ(·)
is permitted to be non-causal. Therefore, the constraint (16)
is more restrictive than (2), and J∗∗ ≥ J∗. Requiring that
the allocation policy be causal inflates the optimal resource
procurement cost from J∗ to J∗∗. We define the price of
causality (PoC) as:
PoC =
J∗∗
J∗
. (17)
This captures the cost premium necessary for causal alloca-
tion. It is clear that PoC ≥ 1. A large PoC indicates that
there is a large cost premium associated with causal allo-
cation of the uncertain demand signals. Perhaps, a forward
6market for procuring reserves is not a suitable mechanism
in such a case. On the other hand, PoC ≈ 1 suggests that
there is a minimal additional cost for not knowing the future
values of the uncertain demand signal.
V. SPECIAL CASES
Optimal resource procurement under causality (15) is an ad-
justable multi-stage robust optimization [22], which is well-
known to be challenging. Instead of solving this problem,
we compute upper bounds on J∗∗ by restricting to a class of
allocation policies. Separately, we compute the exact price
of causality in some special cases.
A. Proportional Allocation Policy
The simplest class of causal allocation policy are proportional
strategies. Here, the uncertain demand signals e are allocated
to procured resources according to a fixed proportion β =
(β1, . . . , βN ) as
φi(e) = βie,where
N∑
i=1
βi = 1, βi ≥ 0. (18)
The allocation φi is clearly causal by construction. Under
this policy, the resource procurement problem (15) reduces
to:
min
α1,...,αN ,β
N∑
i=1
αipii (19)

βiE ⊆ αiSi, ∀i ∈ [N ] (20a)
N∑
i=1
βi = 1, (20b)
αi ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ [N ]. (20c)
The optimal value of (19) offers an upper bound for J∗∗.
Under proportional allocation, it happens that the operator
procures a single controllable resources. More precisely:
Proposition 2. The optimal solution to (19),
(α∗1, . . . , α
∗
N , β
∗), satisfies α∗j 6= 0 for only one index
j.
The proof is deferred to the Appendix. Proposition 2 sug-
gests that under proportional allocation, each resource has
a “virtual price" kipii, where ki captures the shape of the
polytope Si. The virtual prices determine a “merit order" of
the resources: at the optimal solution, only the “cheapest"
resource is selected.
Remark 2. A natural extension is to consider time-varying
proportional allocation:
φi(e) = (β
1
i e
1, . . . , βTi e
T ) (21)
This offers a tighter upper bound on J∗∗. Under time-varying
proportional allocation, resources can not be merit-ordered,
and Proposition 2 no longer holds.
B. Causal-Affine Policies
Consider a more general class of policies as follows:
Definition 4. The allocation policy γ(·) is called causal-
affine if for any i ∈ [N ], there exist lower-triangular matrices
Fi ∈ RT×T and vectors Di ∈ RT such that:{
φi(e) = Fie+Di,∑N
i=1 Fi = I,
∑N
i=1Di = 0,
(22)
where I is the identity matrix.
Such policies are causal by virtue of the lower-triangular
constraints on Fi (as for linear time-varying systems). Under
causal-affine policy, the resource procurement problem can
be solved with a linear program:
Theorem 2. The optimal resource procurement problem (15)
restricted to causal-affine policies is equivalent to:
min
N∑
i=1
αipii (23)

vk =
N∑
i=1
(Fivk +Di) , ∀k ∈ [K], (24a)
N∑
i=1
Fi = I,
N∑
i=1
Di = 0, (24b)
Aiφi(vk) ≤ αiBi, ∀i, k, (24c)
αi ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ [N ], (24d)
The decision variables are α1, . . . , αN , Fi and Di for all i, t.
The proof can be found in the Appendix. The solution to
(23) offers an improved upper bound on J∗∗.
C. Identical or Static Resources
In some special cases, the price of causality can be deter-
mined exactly. One interesting case is when the resource sets
Si are identical up to a scale factor:
Proposition 3. Assume there exists a δi ∈ R, such that
δiSi = δjSj for ∀i, j ∈ [N ]. Then, PoC = 1.
A second interesting case is when the resources have no
dynamic constraints. This happens when the resource sets
Si are hyper-rectangles:
Si = {si ∈ RT |sti ≤ sti ≤ s¯ti, t ∈ [T ]}. (25)
This is because there is no constraint coupling between
sample values sti. We have the following:
Proposition 4. For ∀i ∈ [N ], let Si be a hyper-rectangle:
Si = {si ∈ RT |sti ≤ sti ≤ s¯ti, t ∈ [T ]}. Then, PoC = 1.
7The proofs of Proposition 3 and Proposition 4 are deferred
to the Appendix.
Remark 3. Proposition 3-4 suggest that PoC > 1 is
because of the dynamics constraints and the diversity of the
controllable resources. The price of causality is greater than
1 only if both factors are present.
D. Special Uncertain Signals
Proposition 4 argues that PoC > 1 due to the diversity
and dynamics of the resources. A closely related question
is whether the dynamics of the uncertain demand signals
contribute materially to the price of causality. We have the
following:
Proposition 5. Assume that E is the hyper-rectangle
E = {e ∈ RT |et ≤ et ≤ e¯t,∀t ∈ [T ]}.
Then, it is possible that PoC > 1.
Proposition 5 suggests that the dynamics of the uncertain
demand signals is not the key driver for the price of causality.
If the demand signals are temporally correlated, one could
forecast future signal values based on the current sample.
This can make the price of causality small. Consider for
instance, the intermittent power output of a wind farm which
causes the need to procure balancing power. Day ahead
forecasting of wind generation can have large errors (±30%,
see [23]). On the other hand, hour-ahead forecasts can be
fairly accurate (±5%, see [23]]). Therefore, the future signal
values are known with high accuracy after the first uncertain
signal sample e1 is revealed. This is close to the non-causal
case where we know all future signal values in advance.
Then, we conjecture that PoC ≈ 1.
E. Electricity Storage
We can obtain the exact price of causality for an important
class of problems where the controllable resources are elec-
tricity storage devices.
Consider a collection of N batteries. Battery i has a capacity
constraint Ci and a maximum charge/discharge rate ri.
Denote the initial state of charge for the ith battery (as a
percentage of capacity) as θi. Then, Si contains all si ∈ RT
that satisfy the constraints:
−ri ≤ sti ≤ ri, ∀t ∈ [T ], (26)
0 ≤ θiCi +
t∑
k=1
ski ≤ Ci, ∀t ∈ [T ], i ∈ [N ], (27)
We show that J∗∗ can be obtained by solving a linear
program.
Theorem 3. Consider a group of batteries. Assume their
parameters satisfy
∑N
i=1 Ci ≤ 2
∑N
i=1 ri, and that E = S1⊕
S2⊕· · ·⊕SN , then there exists T0 > 0, so that for ∀T > T0,
J∗∗ is the optimal value for the following linear program:
min
α1,...,αN
N∑
i=1
αipii (28)
N∑
i=1
αiri ≥
N∑
i=1
ri, (29a)
N∑
i=1
αi min(2ri, Ci) ≥
N∑
i=1
Ci, (29b)
where min(a, b) is the smallest element of {a, b}.
The proof of Theorem 3 can be found in the Appendix. Under
the assumption of Theorem 3, we can solve (8) and (28) to
derive J∗ and J∗∗, respectively. This provides the exact price
of causality.
Remark 4. Theorem 3 relies on a crucial condition: E =
S1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ SN . We emphasize that this condition is not too
restrictive if there are large number of sufficiently diverse
resources. In this case, for given Si and pii, we can first find
(η1, . . . , ηN ) such that E is sufficiently close to η1S1⊕· · ·⊕
ηNSN . We define the unit resource as ηiSi and the unit price
as ηipi. It is easy to verify that this is equivalent to (28).
VI. FAIR COST ALLOCATION
The optimal resource procurement cost J∗∗ must be allocated
to the uncontrollable resources that collectively create the
uncertain demand signal e. We study how to allocate this
cost fairly.
Consider a group of L uncontrollable resources. Resource
i contributes di ∈ RT to the collective demand signal, so
e =
∑N
i=1 di. A cost allocation mechanism is a collection of
maps
pii : RT × RT → R : (di, e)→ Ji (30)
This mechanism maps individual demands di and the aggre-
gate demand e to the cost Ji allocated to resource i, i.e.,
Ji = pii(di, e). A just and reasonable cost allocation should
satisfy equity, budget balance and fairness. More formally,
we have
Axiom 1 (Equity). The cost allocation pii(di, e) is equal
if players with the same contribution have the same cost
allocation, i.e., if di = dj , then pii(di, e) = pij(dj , e).
Axiom 2 (Budget Balance). The cost allocation pii(di, e) is
budget balanced, i.e.,
∑L
i=1 pii(di, e) = J
∗∗.
Axiom 3 (Penalty for Cost Causation). Those who contribute
to the uncertain signals should pay for it, i.e., if di · e > 0,
pii(di, e) > 0.
Axiom 4 (Reward for Cost Mitigation). Those who mitigate
the uncertain signals should be rewarded, i.e., if di · e < 0,
pii(di, e) < 0.
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We refer to these Axioms collectively as the cost causation
principle [24]. We have the following:
Proposition 6. The cost allocation mechanism
pii(di, e) =
dTi e
||e||2 J
∗∗ (31)
satisfies the cost causation principle.
The proof of Proposition 6 easily follows from the definition
of the axioms, and is thus omitted.
VII. SIMULATION STUDIES
A. Electricity Storage
We consider two batteries that cover a signal over a T = 3
period delivery window. The capacity of the batteries are
C1 = 1 and C2 = 3, and the maximum charge/discharge
rates are r1 = r2 = 1. Assume the batteries fully discharged
at time 0. Then S1 is the set of s1 ∈ R3 such that:{
−1 ≤ st1 ≤ 1, ∀t = 1, 2, 3.
0 ≤ s11 + s21 + s31 ≤ 1.
and S2 is the set of s2 ∈ R3 such that:{
−1 ≤ st2 ≤ 1, ∀t = 1, 2, 3.
0 ≤ s12 + s22 + s32 ≤ 3.
The uncertain demand signal e is contained in E = S1 ⊕
S2.. All assumptions in Theorem 3 are satisfied and we can
compute the exact price of causality.
We explore the influence of the price vector (pi1, pi2) on the
price of causality. Define κ = pi2/pi1. In this simulation, we
fix pi1 = 1 and vary κ from 0 to 10 in increments of 0.1. The
optimal procurement costs J∗ and J∗∗ are shown in Figure
2, and the price of causality as a function of κ is shown in
Figure 3. In the extremes, κ < 1 or κ > 3, one battery is
too expensive, and only the cheaper battery is procured, i.e.,
either α1 = 0 or α2 = 0. In this case, the allocation problem
is trivial, and the price of causality is 1. In the intermediate
range, 1 ≤ κ ≤ 3, both batteries are procured, and causal
revelation of the demand signal influences the optimal cost.
The maximum price of causality can be as large as 1.33.
B. Energy Reserves
We study the energy reserve procurement problem introduced
in Section II-B. The operator procures reserves from a
forward capacity market to balance supply and demand. The
imbalance signal is revealed every 5 minutes during a 30
minute delivery window, i.e., T = 6.
There are two types of balancing resources: a slow diesel
generator and a gas turbine generator. Each generator has a
capacity constraint and a ramp rate constraint. We set the
generator capacities at 10MW . Typically, the slow diesel
generator has a ramp rate constraint of 7%/min of its capac-
ity, while the fast turbine generator can ramp up and down
its full capacity in 5 minutes [25]. The nominal operation
points for both generators is 5MW . Let sti be the power
deviations from this nominal value. The constraints for the
slow generator are:{
−5MW ≤ st1 ≤ 5MW, ∀t = 1, . . . , 6.
−3.5MW ≤ |st1 − st−11 | ≤ 3.5MW.
The constraints for the fast generator are:
−5MW ≤ st2 ≤ 5MW, ∀t = 1, . . . , 6.
The sets S1 and S2 can be defined accordingly.
We use frequency regulation signals from the PJM market
[26] to construct E. The regulation signal is normalized
between −1 and 1. It is revealed every two seconds and it
indicates the power imbalances of the grid when multiplied
by the total reserve capacity. We use historic RegA data from
the year 2017, and compute the average power imbalance in
every 5 minutes. We divide the entire yearly 5-minute average
trajectory into 17520 segments. Each segment corresponds
to a 30 minute interval, denoted ei ∈ R6. We view each
segment as a sample of the imbalance signal, and our first
goal is to construct E from these samples so that the future
imbalance signals lie in E with very high probability. We
denote the entire data set as D = {e1, . . . , e17520}, and
partition D into a training set D1 = {e1, . . . , e10000} and
a validation set D2 = {e10001, . . . , e17520}. We use D1 to
construct E and D2 to test the model. A naive approach is
to define E = conv (D1). However, this approach has poor
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performance: only 76% of the data from D2 is contained in
E. We therefore inflate E by a scaling factor δ. Surprisingly,
the coverage ratio increases to 93% at δ = 1.01. This
indicates that enlarging the set E by 1% can improve the
performance significantly. Figure 6 shows the coverage ratio
as a function of δ allowing us to choose δ for a desired level
of coverage. We can choose δ according to desired level of
coverage based on Figure 6.
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Figure 6. The coverage ratio as a function of percentage of increase.
We explore the influence of unit prices affect the price of
causality. Let pi1 and pi2 be the unit price of the diesel gen-
erator and turbine generator, respectively. Define κ = pi2/pi1.
We fix pi1 = 1 and vary κ from 0 to 4 in increments of 0.01.
The optimal procurement cost J∗ and our upper bound J¯ are
shown in Figure 4, and the price of causality is shown in 5.
At the extremes, κ < 1 or κ > 2.86, one of the generators
is too expensive, and only the cheaper resource is procured.
The price of causality in these cases is 1. In the intermediate
case, 1 < κ < 2.86, both generators are procured and the
price of causality can be greater then 1. From Figure 5, the
upper bound on the price of causality is 1.04. We note that
this number may be economically significant: it is estimated
that a 1% increase of reserve requirements costs 50 million
dollars per year in California alone.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This paper considered the problem of procuring diverse
resources ex-ante to cover an uncertain demand signal. We
considered two examples: reserve procurement in electric-
ity market and instance procurement for cloud computing.
Through these examples, we have shown that causality in-
duces an additional procurement cost. We formulated the
optimal resource procurement as a set containment linear
program. An upper bound on the price of causality is obtained
by restricting allocation policies to be affine. The exact
price of causality is derived in some special cases, and
all computations are based on linear programming. A cost-
allocation mechanism is proposed. It satisfies the equity,
budget balance, and fairness. Simulation results show in-
teresting dependence of the price of causality on resource
prices. Future research includes deriving lower bound on the
price of causality, analyzing responsive loads, and exploring
endogenous price discovery. We have assumed that resource
prices pii are set by the seller. An intriguing possibility is to
study general forward markets for trading diverse resources
modeled convex sets.
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APPENDIX
A: Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. Comparing (1) with (8), it suffices to show that the
polytope containment constraint (2a) is equivalent to (9a) and
(9b). As E and the Minkowski sum of αiSi are both convex,
(2a) is equivalent to (7). Denote qi,k ∈ RT as the allocation
of vk to the ith resource, then the constraint (7) can be written
as follows:{
vk =
∑N
i=1 qi,k, ∀k ∈ [K],
qi,k ∈ αiSi, ∀k ∈ [K], i ∈ [N ].
(32)
Clearly, (32) is equivalent to (9a) and (9b). This completes
the proof.
B: Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. To prove that α∗1 = α
∗
2 = 1, we first show that J
∗ ≥
4, and α1 = α2 = 1 is the only possible solution that attains
J∗ = 4. Second, we show that α1 = α2 = 1 satisfies the
polytope containment constraint (14a).
To cover (1, 1, 4), the total maximum rate α1r1 +α2r2 is at
least 4 (otherwise covering e3 is not possible). Therefore, a
necessary condition is:
3α1 + α2 ≥ 4. (33)
In addition, to cover (1, 1, 4), the total capacity α1C1+α2C2
is at least 1 + 1 + 4. Therefore, another necessary condition
is:
3α1 + 3α2 ≥ 6. (34)
Combining (33) and (34), the optimal value to the following
problem is an upper bound for J∗:
min
α1,α2
3α1 + α2 (35){
3α1 + α2 ≥ 4, (36a)
3α1 + 3α2 ≥ 6. (36b)
The optimal value of (35) is 4, and the unique solution is
α1 = α2 = 1. Therefore, α1 = α2 = 1 is necessary.
Next we show that α1 = α2 = 1 is sufficient, i.e., the
polytope containment constraint (14a) is satisfied. To see
this, note that both E and S1 ⊕ S2 are convex. Therefore,
(14a) is equivalent to the vertices of E contained in S1⊕S2.
This trivially holds for the vertex (0, 0, 0) and the vertex
(1, 1,−2) ∈ S1. The other vertex (1, 1, 4) can be decomposed
into (0, 0, 3) ∈ S1 and (1, 1, 1) ∈ S2. This completes our
argument.
To show that the optimal asset mix is insufficient to causally
cover E, we proceed as follows. Let φti(·) be the allocation
of signal et to resource i. The first two elements of (1, 1,−2)
and (1, 1, 4) are the same. Since et is revealed causally, the
allocation for the first two periods should also be the same
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for (1, 1,−2) and (1, 1, 4). To cover the signal (1, 1, 4), the
unique allocation is to exclusively use the second battery for
the first two periods, and then use both batteries at the third
period, i.e., φ11(·) = φ21(·) = 0, φ31(·) = 3, and φ12(·) =
φ22(·) = φ32(·) = 1. On the other hand, if we exclusively use
the second battery for the first two periods, then (1, 1,−2)
cannot be covered, since at time 3, the maximum discharging
rate of the second battery is 1 < 2. This completes the proof.
D: Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. For each i ∈ [N ], define ki as the smallest αi such
that E ⊆ αiSi. Assume that ki exits for all i ∈ [N ]. This
assumption has no loss of generality, since if ki does not
exist for some i, then there is no αi such that βiE ⊆ αiSi
when β > 0. In this case, the optimal solution to (19) has
to satisfy αi = βi = 0. This means the resource i is neither
used nor procured, so we can remove it from [N ]
Based on the definition of ki, E ⊆ αiSi is equivalent to
αi ≥ ki, and the constraint (20a) is equivalent to αi ≥ kiβi.
Plug this into (20a), then the resource procurement problem
(19) becomes:
min
α1,...,αN ,β
∑
i∈[N ]
αipii (37)
αi ≥ kiβi, ∀i ∈ [N ]∑
i∈[N ] βi = 1,
0 ≤ βi ≤ 1,∀i ∈ [N ].
Clearly, at the optimal solution, we have αi = kiβi for all
i ∈ [N ]. Then (37) is equivalent to:
min
{βi,i∈[N ]}
∑
i∈[N ]
kipiiβi{∑
i∈[N ] βi = 1,
0 ≤ βi ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ [N ].
Rank all resource in the ascending order of kipii. At the
optimal solution, only resources with the smallest kipii is
selected. This competes the proof.
E: Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. Since the allocation policy is affine, the resource
procurement problem can be written as follows:
min
N∑
i=1
αipii (38)
et =
N∑
i=1
(
Cti [e
1, . . . , et]T +Dti
)
, ∀t ∈ [T ], (39a)
Ai[φ
1
i (e
1), . . . , φTi (e
1:T )]T ≤ αiBi,∀i ∈ [N ], (39b)
αi ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ [N ], (39c)
∀e ∈ E. (39d)
where φti(·) satisfies (22). Note that constraints (39a)-(39c)
is linear with respect to e. Therefore, (39a)-(39c) holds for
all e ∈ E if and only if it holds for all vertices of E. This
is exactly (24).
F: Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Let S = δiSi. The polytope containment constraint
(2a) becomes:
E ⊆ α1
δ1
S ⊕ · · · ⊕ αN
δN
S. (40)
Let σi = αi/δi, then (40) is equivalent to:
E ⊆
N∑
i=1
σiS. (41)
Consider the following allocation policy:
φti(e
1:t) =
σi∑N
i=1 σi
et. (42)
Clearly, (42) is causal. To prove it covers all e ∈ E, we note
that (41) is the same as
σi∑N
i=1 σi
E ⊆ σiS. Therefore:
σi∑N
i=1 σi
e ∈ σiS = αiSi, ∀e ∈ E.
This completes the proof.
G: Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. Let α∗ = (α∗1, . . . , α
∗
N ) be the optimal solution to the
resource procurement problem (1). It suffices to construct a
causal policy that covers all e ∈ E under α∗. To this end,
define
(
φt1(e
1:t), . . . , φtN (e
1:t)
)
as any vector that:{
et =
∑N
i=1 φ
t
i(e
1:t), ∀t ∈ [T ],
α∗i s
t
i ≤ φti(e1:t) ≤ α∗i s¯ti, ∀i ∈ [N ], t ∈ [T ].
The above allocation policy is causal, and it exists. If it does
not exist, then it indicates that there is some t such that
et <
∑N
i=1 α
∗
i s
t
i or e
t >
∑N
i=1 α
∗
i s¯
t
i. This contradicts (2a).
For the same reason, it covers all e ∈ E. This completes the
proof.
H: Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. It suffices to construct an example with PoC > 1.
Consider to use two batteries to cover signals in E = {e|0 ≤
e1 ≤ 1, 0 ≤ e2 ≤ 1,−5 ≤ e3 ≤ 7}. The capacity of
each battery is C1 = 9 and C2 = 5, and the maximum
charging/discharging rate is r1 = 2, r2 = 5. At time 0,
the initial state of charge is 33% and 40%, respectively. Let
p1 = 2 and p2 = 5. In this case, we can show that the optimal
solution to (1) is α1 = α2 = 1. However, we can also show
that when α1 = α2 = 1, no causal policy can be found to
cover both (0, 0,−5) and (0, 0, 7). The proof is similar to
that in Section III-A, and is therefore omitted.
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I: Proof of Theorem 3
To prove Theorem 3, we need the following lemma:
Lemma 1. Under the assumptions of Theorem 3, there
exist T0 such that for all T > T0, there exists
(e1, . . . , eT−1) that satisfies (e1, . . . , eT−1,
∑
i Ci/2) ∈ E
and (e1, . . . , eT−1,−∑i Ci/2) ∈ E.
Proof. since E = S1⊕S2⊕· · ·⊕SN , it suffices to construct a
sequence (e1, . . . , eT−1) and two allocation policies to cover
(e1, . . . , eT−1,
∑
i Ci/2) and (e
1, . . . , eT−1,−∑i Ci/2) us-
ing unit batteries. Without loss of generality, assume that all
batteries are empty at time 0, i.e., θi = 0. If θi > 0, we can
construct a sequence of signals to empty all batteries first
and then concatenate this sequence with (e1, . . . , eT−1).
Consider the first allocation policy to satisfy the following:
• Each battery i is charged by no more than ri for all
t ≤ T − 1, i.e., ∑tk=1 ski ≤ ri, ∀t ≤ T − 1,
• The (i + 1)th battery is used only if the ith battery is
already charged by ri, i.e., sti > 0 only if s
t
j = rj for
all j < i.
Under this policy, the maximum total power the batteries can
provide at time t is
∑N
i=1 ri −
∑t−1
k=1 e
k. On the other hand,
consider a signal sequence (e1, . . . , eT−1) that satisfies:
∑T−1
t=1 e
t =
1
2
∑N
i=1 Ci,
et ≥ 0, ∀0 ≤ t ≤ T − 1.
(43)
Clearly, for any t ≤ T−1, as long as (e1, . . . , eT−1) satisfies
(43), we have et ≤∑Ni=1 Ci/2−∑t−1k=1 ek. Since ∑Ni=1 ri ≥∑N
i=1 Ci/2, we have:
et ≤
N∑
i=1
Ci/2−
t−1∑
k=1
ek ≤
N∑
i=1
ri −
t−1∑
k=1
ek.
Therefore, the first policy covers all (e1, . . . , eT−1) that
satisfies (43). In addition, since each battery i are charged
by at most ri at the first T − 1 steps, all batteries can be
discharged to empty at time T . Therefore, it is able to cover
−∑Ni=1 Ci/2 at time T .
The second policy satisfies the following conditions:
• Each battery i is charged by no more than Ci−ri for all
t ≤ T − 1. Formally, ∑tk=1 ski ≤ Ci − ri, ∀t ≤ T − 1,
• The (i + 1)th battery is used only if the ith battery is
already charged by Ci − ri, i.e., sti > 0 only if stj =
Cj − rj for all j < i.
Trivially, under this policy, we can find a T0 > 0 so
that (e1, . . . , eT0) can be covered by the unit batteries and
satisfies: 
∑T0
t=1 e
t =
1
2
∑N
i=1 Ci,
et ≥ 0, ∀0 ≤ t ≤ T0.
For any T > T0, let (e1, . . . , eT−1) = (e1, . . . , eT0 , 0, . . . , 0).
Since (e1, . . . , eT0) is covered by unit batteries,
(e1, . . . , eT−1) is also covered. In addition, since each
battery i is charged by at most Ci − ri, the policy also
guarantees to cover
∑N
i=1 Ci/2 at time T . This completes
the proof of Lemma 1.
Using Lemma 1, the proof of Theorem 3 is as follows:
Proof. It suffices to show that (29) is both necessary and
sufficient for (16). To prove necessity, we first note that
(29a) is clearly necessary: if (29a) is not satisfied, we can
construct some signal such that et =
∑N
i=1 ri for some t,
then this signal can not be covered. To show that (29b) is also
necessary, we note that according to Lemma 1, there exist T0
and (e1, . . . , eT−1) such that (e1, . . . , eT−1,
∑
i Ci/2) ∈ E
and (e1, . . . , eT−1,−∑i Ci/2) ∈ E. Since the first T − 1
elements of the signals are the same, a causal policy should
make the same allocation decision for these two cases in the
first T − 1 steps. Therefore, at time T , the batteries should
satisfy both
∑
i Ci/2 and −
∑
i Ci/2. Let x
t
i denote the state
of charge of battery i at time t, i.e., xti = θiCi +
∑t
k=1 s
t
i,
then the following conditions should hold:
N∑
i=1
αi min(ri, Ci − xT−1i ) ≥
1
2
N∑
i=1
Ci, (44)
N∑
i=1
αi min(ri, x
T−1
i ) ≥
1
2
N∑
i=1
Ci. (45)
where min(ri, Ci − xT−1i ) is the maximum energy battery i
can absorb at time T , and min(ri, xT−1i ) is the maximum
energy battery i can provide at time T . Clearly, (44) is
necessary for the policy to cover
∑N
i=1 Ci/2 at time T , and
(45) is necessary for the policy to cover −∑Ni=1 Ci/2 at
time T . Adding up (44) and (45), and using the following
inequality (can be verified by discussing different cases):
min(ri, Ci−xT−1i ) + min(ri, xT−1i ) ≤ min(2ri, Ci), (46)
we obtain (29b) as a necessary condition. Therefore, (29) is
necessary for (16).
To prove sufficiency, we construct a causal policy that covers
all signals in E when (29) holds. Rank all batteries in
a decreasing order of Ci/ri. Without loss of generality,
assume battery 1 has the largest Ci/ri, battery 2 has the
second largest, and so on. Divide [N ] into three subsets:
N1 = {i ∈ [N ]|Ci = ri}, N2 = {i ∈ [N ]|ri < Ci < 2ri},
and N3 = {i ∈ [N ]|Ci ≥ 2ri}.
To enhance readability, we first prove the result for a simple
example, then we discuss how to generalize the proof to
all other cases. As an example, consider a group of three
batteries with the following parameter: C1 = r1, C2 ≥ 2r2,
and C3 ≥ 2r3. We propose a causal allocation policy that
divides each battery into a few blocks, and uses each block
according to an alternating order to construct a virtual battery.
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Figure 7. The causal allocation: battery 1 is one block α1r1, battery 2
is divided into 2 identical blocks α2r2, and battery 3 is divided into two
identical blocks α3r3. These blocks are arranged in the following order:
α3r3, α2r2, α1r1, α3r3, α2r2.
The idea is illustrated in Figure 7, where the first battery
contributes one block α1r1, the second battery contributes
two identical blocks α2r2, and the third battery contributes
two identical blocks α3r3. These blocks are arranged in the
following order: α3r3, α2r2, α1r1, α3r3, α2r2, as illustrated
in Figure 7. Formally, the allocation in Figure 7 can be
described as one that respects the following conditions:
xt2 = 0 unless x
t
3 = α3r3,
xt1 = 0 unless x
t
2 ≥ α2r2 and xt3 ≥ α3r3,
xt3 ≤ α3r3 unless xt1 = α1C1,
xt2 ≤ α2r2 unless xt1 = α1C1 and xt3 = 2α3r3,
xt2 ≤ 2α2r2, xt3 ≤ 2α3r3.
(47)
Clearly, this single battery has capacity α1C1 + 2α2r2 +
2α2r3. Due to (29b), it is greater than
∑
i Ci. In addition,
the charging/discharging rate is
∑
i αiri. Due to (29a), it is
greater than
∑
i ri. Therefore, it covers all signals in E =
S1 ⊕ S2 ⊕ S3.
Next we generalize the proof idea to all possible cases. Note
that in the example, N1 = {1}, N2 = ∅, and N3 = {2, 3}.
We simply need to generalize the result to all possible
combinations of N1, N2 and N3. First, we note that if there
are more than one battery in N1, there is no difference,
as these batteries can be used as a single one. Second, if
there are more than two batteries in N3, then the proof idea
of the example simply goes through. Third, if N2 is non-
empty, i.e., j ∈ N2, then we remove battery j from [N ],
divide it into two batteries, and then place these two batteries
back to [N ]. In particular, denote these two new batteries as
i = N + 1 and i = N + 2, such that αN+1 = αN+2 = αj ,
CN+1 = rN+1 = 2ri − Ci and CN+2 = 2Ci − 2ri,
rN+2 = Ci − ri. Note that CN+1 + CN+2 = Cj and
rN+1 + rN+2 = rj . Therefore, it is a division of battery j.
After this operation, we have N + 1 ∈ N1 and N + 2 ∈ N3.
Apply this operation for all i ∈ N2 until N2 = ∅, then
we are back to the case of the example. This completes the
proof.
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